On 6–7 November 2026, Keplr paused Google and Apple login after users reported unauthorized transactions on accounts created through those social sign-in paths. Web3Auth (the Consensys-owned provider behind those embedded wallets, also branded as MetaMask Embedded Wallets) then said it had identified a security issue in its infrastructure affecting certain embedded wallets used by Keplr, leading to a private key breach for some social-login accounts.
This is not a consensus bug and not a Keplr smart-contract exploit. It is an off-chain custody dependency failure: wallets that never showed users a recovery phrase still held spendable keys behind a third-party service. Neither company has published a confirmed loss total or a technical root-cause write-up. Social-media loss figures remain unverified, so we do not repeat them.
At 21:13 UTC on 6 November 2026, Web3Auth said it was aware of a security issue affecting Web3Auth’s services used by some third parties, had temporarily paused the embedded wallet service, and found no evidence that MetaMask users are impacted. The same wording appeared on the MetaMask developer forum. Web3Auth’s status page put Login Service into maintenance “due to a security incident.” The notice named neither Keplr nor a root cause.
At 04:38 UTC on 7 November, Keplr said it had received reports of unauthorized transactions on some accounts created with Google or Apple login, had flagged them to Web3Auth, and was investigating jointly. Its initial assessment was explicit:
Keplr co-founder Josh Lee separately said the incident originated at Web3Auth, not from a hack of Keplr’s own code, and gave the early ~20% of social-login accounts affected / fraction already exploited estimate cited above. He also said Keplr was working with the Web3Auth and MetaMask team on tracking and recovery, and that the plan for recoverable accounts included a path to move funds to a new recovery-phrase wallet — details to follow.
At 16:53 UTC, Web3Auth updated: it had identified a security issue in Web3Auth infrastructure affecting certain embedded wallets used by Keplr, was working with Keplr to secure assets from affected accounts, and warned users to ignore unofficial recovery offers.
Minutes later (17:06–17:07 UTC), Web3Auth said it and partners had begun whitehat recovery on vulnerable but not yet impacted wallets, using the same path as the original attacker. Some of those transfers, it said, had been mistaken for the attacker’s; funds recovered that way were described as safe; a verified list of recovery addresses was being prepared so users could tell rescue from theft.
At 17:17 UTC, Keplr restated the boundary and the new guidance for social-login users: assist Web3Auth’s effort to secure assets; staked and locked assets take longer; some Google/Apple accounts may already show a reduced or empty balance because of mitigation, not necessarily because of the attacker; move any remaining liquid assets to a recovery-phrase or hardware-wallet account; only trust Keplr and Web3Auth official channels.
An empty balance, in this incident, is therefore ambiguous until Web3Auth publishes its verified recovery-address list and users can match destinations.
A seed-phrase or hardware Keplr wallet keeps key material under the user (or device). A Google/Apple Keplr account, per Keplr support descriptions summarized in secondary reporting, never presented a recovery phrase at creation — Web3Auth generated the key material (commonly described as DKG with encrypted local storage) behind an OAuth button.
That is convenient for beginners. It also changes the blast radius:
The theme matches other recent wallet-adjacent failures: signing and key-management infrastructure is security-critical. See our Binance EIP-7702 hot-wallet analysis and Argent-style recovery replay write-up. Keplr/Web3Auth sits upstream of both — the key never needed a buggy module if the issuer already leaked it.
Treat social-login / MPC / embedded-wallet vendors as in-scope for your threat model, not as a black box that “handles keys for you.”
Separate account classes in product and in incident response. Keplr’s clearest communication was the split between recovery-phrase / hardware wallets and social-login wallets. Apps that blur those classes in UI or support copy will mis-direct users during a breach.
Plan a migration path before you need it. Lee’s “move to a recovery phrase inside Keplr” plan is the right shape: users need a way to leave the compromised issuer without re-importing the same secret into the same compromised path.
Publish recovery destinations early, or users will mislabel rescues as theft. Web3Auth’s verified address list is the difference between a chaotic on-chain picture and a readable one.
Do not over-claim MetaMask safety from a preliminary “no evidence” line. That statement was scoped to evidence at pause time. Keplr (named) and Dungeon Wallet (warned) sat inside the affected set.
Reuse a structured review for wallet / AA features. Guardian flows, recovery delays, signature nonces and key-export paths belong on the same checklist as DeFi pricing bugs — see our smart contract security checklist.
# Simplified threat-model sketch. Not Web3Auth or Keplr source.
# user --OAuth--> vendor identity --> DKG / key service --> wallet key
# infrastructure vuln --> key exposure --> attacker spends
# whitehats race the same path on not-yet-hit wallets
# seed / hardware wallets sit outside that issuer path (per Keplr)| Item | Value |
|---|---|
| Primary wallet named | Keplr (social login via Web3Auth) |
| Provider | Web3Auth / MetaMask Embedded Wallets (Consensys) |
| Account class at risk | Google / Apple login (embedded) wallets |
| Account class not at risk (Keplr initial assessment) | Recovery phrase, hardware wallet |
| Web3Auth pause | 6 Nov 2026, 21:13 UTC |
| Keplr first warning | 7 Nov 2026, 04:38 UTC |
| Key-breach + whitehat language | 7 Nov 2026, ~16:53–17:17 UTC |
| Scope hint | ~20% of Keplr social-login accounts affected; fraction exploited (Josh Lee) |
| Confirmed USD loss | Not published by Keplr or Web3Auth |
| MetaMask users | No evidence of impact in Web3Auth’s initial investigation |
| Other app note | Dungeon Wallet warned users about the same Web3Auth incident |
The Keplr / Web3Auth incident is a reminder that social login is a custody choice, not just a UX choice. Users inherit the vendor’s infrastructure risk; builders inherit an incident-response duty they cannot outsource with a status-page sentence. Until a root cause and verified recovery-address list are public, treat social-login balances as potentially exposed, keep seed- and hardware-backed wallets on a separate trust tier, and ignore DM “recovery” offers.
If you ship wallets, account-abstraction modules, or apps that embed third-party social login, talk to our team or review audit pricing before those key paths go live against real user funds.
How a SOL Genesis Vault pricing misconfig enabled a ~$412K undercollateralized loan, and a USDC vault NAV inflation attempt of ~$521K was halted in 30 seconds.
How TENDRIL's PoolControl sell hook burned the PancakeSwap pair's own tokens, synced reserves to 6,678 wei, and let one swap empty nearly all USDT on BSC.
How a flash-loaned WBNB dump cut PancakeSwap's BNB price ~98x, inflated a CoreVault redemption ~33x and pulled 259 BNB from its InsurancePool on BSC.
How 53M MAMO sent straight to Moonwell's market on Base bypassed a 20M supply cap, inflated collateral 3.68x and unlocked $11.03M of loans.